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Abstract
The federal funds rate became uninformative about the stance of monetary pol-
icy from December 2008 to November 2015. During the same period, unconventional
monetary policy actions, like large-scale asset purchases, show the Federal Reserve’s
intention to depress longer-term interest rates. This paper considers a long-term real
interest rate as an alternative monetary policy indicator in a structural VAR frame-
work. Based on an event study of FOMC announcements, I advance a novel measure of
long-term interest rate volatility with important implication for monetary policy identi-
fication. I find that monetary policy shocks identified with this volatility measure drive
significant swings in credit market sentiments and real output. In contrast, monetary
policy shocks identified by otherwise standard unexpected policy rate changes lead to
muted responses of financial frictions and production. Our results support the validity
of the risk-taking channel and suggest an indispensable role of financial markets in
monetary policy transmission.
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1 Introduction
Conventionally, monetary economists use changes in short-term interest rates, e.g., the fed-
eral funds rate for the United States, to gauge monetary policy stances and identify monetary
policy shocks. The Taylor rule, in its various iterations, provides theoretical support for these
practices. However, from December 2008 to November 2015, when the federal funds rate
essentially collapsed to its zero lower bound (ZLB), the measurement of monetary policy ex-
periences two challenges, such as an uninformative short-term rate and the quantification of
unconventional monetary policy tools. Both of these impose question marks on the validity
of a Taylor rule strategy in monetary policy identification.
One potential solution is to construct measures sensitive to policy rate changes during
the non-ZLB period and otherwise unconstrained by the ZLB. For instance, Krippner (2013),
Lombardi and Zhu (2014) and Wu and Xia (2016) use parametric estimations from a factor
approach to construct ”shadow policy rates” that can accommodate negative values and
may give insight on how far the nominal short-term rate would reach if unconstrained by
the ZLB. Alternatively, Freedman (1994) proposes a Monetary Conditions Index, which is
derived from a linear combination of short-term interest rates and exchange rates, to infer
monetary policy actions. However, without a proper identification scheme, this measure
has some shortcomings as the exchange rate is subjected to influences other than monetary
policy decisions. Some economists revisit monetary aggregates and supply evidence that a
superlative measure of money (i.e., Divisia monetary index) can properly reflect the stance
of monetary policy in structural VAR (SVAR) models, especially in the aftermath of the
2007 financial crisis (Keating et al., 2014, 2019).
Those alternative measures are based on the common wisdom that monetary policy only
exerts influence through short-term rates. However, unconventional monetary policy tools
extensively applied during the ZLB period may have affected longer-term interest rates.
For instance, the Federal Reserve increasingly relies on communication, such as forward
guidance, to implement monetary policy, particularly since the possibilities to steer the
economy via short-term rate policy has been limited by the effective zero lower bound (refer
to Cœure´ (2017) and Blinder (2018)). Woodford (2012) and Swanson and Williams (2014)
show that the forward guidance strategy affects the two-year–and even longer maturity–
Treasury yields through guiding expectations on future policy rates. Another example of
these unconventional tools is a series of large-scale asset purchases (LSAP) programs between
late 2008 and October 2014 that the Federal Reserve conducted. These programs expanded
the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet with direct purchases of longer-term Treasury securities
and mortgage-backed securities in private markets. The explicit intention was to depress
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longer-term interest rates. An increasing amount of researches demonstrate the significant
impact of LSAPs on long-term Treasury yields1. Former FOMC Chair Bernanke summarized
that
”Forward rate guidance affects longer-term interest rates primarily by influencing in-
vestors’ expectations of future short-term interest rates. LSAPs, in contrast, most directly
affect term premiums.” Bernanke (2013)
We suggest a medium- to long-term interest rate as an alternative monetary policy indica-
tor with three main considerations. First, we want this measure to be sensitive to variation in
short-term rates. Second, this measure should be unrestricted by the ZLB. Third, it should
reflect the non-negligible impact of unconventional monetary policy tools with particular
attention for the long end of the yield curve.
Admittedly, quantifying monetary policy actions through longer-term rates is a relatively
new approach, though it has been gradually gaining attention. Swanson andWilliams (2014),
Hanson and Stein (2015) and others argue that Treasury yields with more than two-year
maturities may properly reflect the impact of forward guidance. In an SVAR model, Wright
(2012) identifies the impact of LSAPs through heteroskedasticity of the reduced-from residual
from the 10-year Treasury yield. Weale and Wieladek (2016) include the 10-year Treasury
yield in an SVAR model to show how purchases of government bonds by the Bank of England
and the Federal Reserve affect long-term yields. Gurkaynak et al. (2004) and Swanson (2017)
extract factors from prices of financial assets, including a variety of long-term securities, to
measure the effects of policy rate changes, forward guidance, and LSAPs. They specifically
identify the factor most closely related LSAPs as the only one that affects long-term interest
rates. DSGE models on monetary transmission are still preliminary in depicting the role
of longer-term rates in transmitting monetary policy to the economy (please refer to the
Christiano et al. (2010) review). To our knowledge, this is the first paper that explicitly
considers a long-term rate as the policy indicator in an SVAR model.
The critical challenge in considering a long-term interest rate—such as the 10-year real
yield—as the policy indicator lies in the identification of exogenous monetary policy actions
from fluctuations in long-term rates.
Our approach stems from an event study of FOMC announcements and a high-frequency
identification approach in SVAR models. Kuttner (2001) constitute an event study from
shifts of the spot-month federal funds future rate in each FOMC announcement date. This
is done in order to gauge unexpected monetary policy actions (see also Gu¨rkaynak et al.
1Please refer to Gagnon (2010), Gagnon et al. (2011), d’Amico et al. (2012), Rosa (2012), Swanson (2015)
and more.
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(2005), Hamilton (2008) and Campbell et al. (2012)). More recently, Gertler and Karadi
(2015) advance a VAR identification strategy in which unexpected changes in the federal
funds futures rate, captured by an event-study approach, facilitates the identification of
monetary policy shocks from movements in the policy indicator (the one-year Treasury yield).
However, simply applying the aforementioned strategy to identify policy shocks in a long-
term rate could be counterproductive. Figure 1 highlights that the 10-year rate seems to be
considerably more volatile than the federal funds rate and the one-year Treasury yield. It
may be conjectural to assert that unexpected funds rate changes should reflect the overall
impacts of FOMC announcements on a long-term rate. In the alternative, we investigate
other institutional and theoretical perspectives of monetary policy transmission that extend
beyond traditional short-term offer rates.
Figure 1: Federal Funds Rate, 1yr and 10yr Treasury Yields
Institutionally, the Federal Reserve seems to maintain different degrees of intention on
the two ends of the yield curve. Interest rate volatility is frequently under-explored in the
context of monetary policy.
For the short end of the yield curve, it might be reasonable to allow for a level change of
the short-term rate, within a tight window around FOMC announcements, to fully represent
the exogenous monetary policy actions. This is an appropriate mechanism because of the
Federal Reserve’s explicit commitment to the policy rate target. The near-term expectation
of the federal funds rate may immediately adjust to a newly announced target if the Federal
Reserve constantly fine tunes the discrepancy of the policy rate from its target range via
4
open market operations. As a result, the fluctuation of the policy rate, ex-post an FOMC
meeting, is uninformative in assessing the effects of policy actions 2.
The Federal Reserve does not explicitly express and maintain a target for any long-term
rates. After an FOMC press release, the statement may induce heteroskedastic variation in
long-term rate fluctuations around ex-post steady states. In other words, when analyzing
the influence of an FOMC decision, the investigation should not be restricted to changes in
the expected levels of long rates, but also shed light on shifts in expected volatility.
Recent theoretical developments in the topic of monetary transmission reconfirm our
focus on the critical but less explored role of interest rate volatility. Rajan (2006) and
Adrian and Shin (2008) discuss the impact of monetary policy on the risk-taking behavior
of financial intermediaries. Risk perception and risk tolerance of financial intermediaries
contribute to their varying risk-taking behavior and thus affect economic activity. Borio
and Zhu (2012) formally propose the concept of the risk-taking channel and review how
monetary policy affects banks’ perceived risk. The countercyclical nature of perceived risk
in the risk-taking channel is isomorphic to the external financing premium in a financial
accelerator model (Bernanke et al., 1999). It is relatively common in the literature to utilize
the volatility implied by option prices to gauge the perceived risk in a given market3.
Given these sparse but interrelated studies, we hypothesize that interest rate volatil-
ity plays a role in the monetary policy transmission, especially in the risk-taking channel.
However, to my knowledge, at the time of this writing, there is no existing event study mea-
sure that quantifies the impact of monetary policy announcements on expectations of the
volatility of long-term rates. Furthermore, little effort has been dedicated to investigating
the potential role of movements in the second moment of a long-term rate in motivating
monetary policy shocks and driving innovations in the long-term rate.
Overall, we center attention on how monetary policy transmits to the yield curve, espe-
cially to long-term rates, and, in turn, how it propagates to aggregate economic activities.
We introduce a long-term real rate and an event study measure with the implied volatility
of a long-term nominal rate into an otherwise standard SVAR model.
In our econometric technique, selecting a long-term real rate as a policy indicator affords
us some versatility to include more comprehensive information content from FOMC state-
ments. We identify monetary policy shocks with the assistance of high-frequency external
2Bundick et al. (2017) construct an implied volatility about short-term interest rates via VIX methodology.
However, instead of identifying monetary policy shocks, they identify a monetary policy uncertainty shock
which does not contemporaneously respond to a policy rate shock under a recursive ordering.
3Please refer to Fleming et al. (1995), Fleming (1998) and Christensen and Prabhala (1998) for perceived
risk in stock market, and Carlson et al. (2005), Emmons et al. (2006) and Swanson (2006) for perceived
uncertainty in policy rates
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instruments. We construct event studies respectively from movements of the spot-month
funds future rate and variation in the implied volatility of 10-year rate around each FOMC
announcement. From this construct, we generate two policy instruments which are time
series of policy rate surprises and time series of volatility surprises. The SVAR impulse
responses show that both policy rate surprises and volatility surprises can significantly stim-
ulate fluctuations in the long-term real rate and the price level without incurring the price
puzzle put forth by Eichenbaum (1992), but only the latter drives swings of financial fric-
tions and output. These findings support the financial accelerator models (Bernanke et al.,
1999) in which financial intermediations amplify the policy impact on economic activity.
Our results also question the cost-of-capital effect in Neoclassical theory of investment since
production seems muted to the policy-rate-induced change in the long-term real rate. In
terms of monetary transmission channels, we obtain evidence in support of the risk-taking
channel but fail to observe the validity of the conventional Keynesian interest rate channel.
This paper extends an SVAR model to examine the validity of different mainstream
monetary transmission channels within a comparable framework. Furthermore, we generate
the first measure of monetary-policy-induced changes in the expected volatility of monetary
policy shocks in the long run. This measure has the potential to be an alternative mone-
tary policy surprise to indicate the risk-side impact of monetary policy. Lastly, we observe
relatively independent monetary policy transmission mechanisms through the two ends of
the yield curve. This finding may open a window for refined monetary policy identifications
respectively for short- and long-term interest rates.
This research also connects with a growing topic focusing on the linkage between short-
and long-term rates surrounding FOMC announcements (Cochrane and Piazzesi, 2002; Gu¨rkay-
nak et al., 2005). Hanson and Stein (2015) suggest a story of yield-searching investors to
explain how a change in the short-term rate induced by a policy rate movement contributes to
the instant shift of the term premia of long-term real rates. However, they make an assump-
tion to simplify the transmission from monetary policy to long-term rates; that changes of
short-term rates can properly assess the full information content of FOMC announcements.
This paper relaxes this assumption and further asks a more structural question: which com-
ponents of monetary policy propagate to the economy through long-term rates. Our results
are consistent with previous findings that an unexpected policy rate change affects long-term
nominal and real rates, but additionally, it reveals that the interest rate volatility, rather
than the policy rate, plays the primary role in transmitting the effect of monetary policy to
economic activity through long-term rates.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follow. Section Two presents our econometric framework
of structural VAR model and identification strategy. Section Three introduces the data
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and sample, especially the policy indicator and policy instruments. Section Four lays out
the empirical results, and Section Five discusses their implications on the monetary policy
transmission. Section Six offers a detailed procedure of the construction of the volatility
surprise for readers’ reference, and Section Seven concludes.
2 Econometric Framework
Our econometric analysis is based on an SVAR model with an intention to investigate the
monetary policy transmission mechanism, through which monetary policy affects economic
activity. We select a high-frequency identification (HFI) scheme to identify monetary policy
shocks.
The HFI approach is developed on Stock and Watson (2012), Mertens and Ravn (2013)
and Gertler and Karadi (2015). It identifies monetary policy shocks with the assistance
of external instrumental variables. This method is originally designed to deal with the
sensitivity of the included endogenous financial variable to structural shocks (Bagliano and
Favero, 1999; Cochrane and Piazzesi, 2002; Faust et al., 2004; Mertens and Ravn, 2013). In
an SVAR model with financial variables, recursive timing restrictions in the conventional
Cholesky identification should be questionable. It is arduous to justify that those financial
variables, given their high-frequency fluctuations, do not contemporaneously respond to
certain structural shocks. In contrast, HFI does not restrict the timing of contemporaneous
responses.
A feature of the external instrument identification scheme is the separation of policy
instruments and policy indicators. A policy instrument is captured in the high-frequency fi-
nancial data, such as the spot-month federal funds future rate or the option-implied volatility
of the 10-year rate, by imposing an “adequately small” time window on each FOMC meeting
announcement. Policy instruments produced by this event study manner measure the unex-
pected impact of monetary policy caused by FOMC announcements and carry relevance to
monetary policy shocks. Furthermore, if time windows are properly designed to cope with
the impact of economic news, those instruments should be orthogonal to other structural
economic shocks. A policy indicator is one of the endogenous variables in a lower-frequency
VAR, indicating monetary policy stances. A reduced-form residual in the policy indicator
may be attributed to monetary policy shocks as well as accommodative policy actions and
other structural shocks. To identify monetary policy shocks, a policy instrument acts as an
instrumental variable for the policy indicator to estimate the unbiased contemporaneous re-
sponses of the policy indicator to structural monetary policy shocks. This method combines
the features of event studies with structural identification in SVAR models.
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However, previous studies like Gertler and Karadi (2015) limit the potential of this frame-
work by implicitly making two relatively strict assumptions; that monetary policy takes effect
through short-term rates, and that monetary policy is confined to policy rate changes. We
relax those restrictions by proposing a long-term interest rate as a policy indicator and
constructing a policy instrument concerning the risk-side implication of each entire FOMC
announcement.
On one hand, there is an increasing amount of evidence suggesting that the monetary
policy affects long-term rates in complicated manners. There are at least four avenues
discussed in the literature. First, the conventional Keynesian interest rate channel suggests
that the policy rate changes may pass through to long-term nominal rates based on the
expectations theory of term structure, and may further affect long-term real rates because of
sticky price setting in Keynesian models. Second, unexpected changes of the policy rate lead
to variation in the term premia of distant forward rates according to Jorda (2005), Hanson
and Stein (2015) and others. Third, unconventional monetary policy tools, especially LSAPs,
affects longer-term rates by purchasing longer-term securities in private markets. Lastly,
monetary policy and Federal Reserve’s communication with the public may influence the
risk perception of financial intermediaries and affect long-term real rates via variation in
risk-taking behavior such as long-term lending (Borio and Zhu, 2012). Although long-term
rates seem to be unavoidable nodes in the policy transmission, they are not included in the
state-of-art monetary VAR models, such as those in Christiano et al. (1999). We possess
extremely limited understanding of the role of long-term rates in the ”black box” between
monetary policy and economic activity. This paper sheds light on this black box by taking
a long-term real rate as a potential policy indicator. It may reflect the full spectrum of the
aforementioned impact of monetary policy on long-term rates.
On the other hand, studies on the risk-taking channel attract increasing attention but this
channel is seldom identified in a VAR model. There are extensive empirical studies on the
linkage of monetary policy and bank’s risk-taking behavior4. However, without a structural
model, it is unpractical to investigate the endogenous interactions among monetary policy,
risk perception in financial markets and economic activity. This paper generates a time series
of monetary surprises, that capture how each FOMC meeting announcement, instead of
each policy rate change, shifts the near-term expectation of long-term interest rate volatility.
Then, we utilize these surprises in interest rate volatility to identify monetary policy shocks
in the risk-taking channel.
4Please refer to Altunbas et al. (2009), Gambacorta (2009), Delis et al. (2012), Bruno and Shin (2015)
and Dell’Ariccia et al. (2017).
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In summary, our SVAR framework not only allows for influences of monetary policy on
the long end of the yield curve, but also consider the entire impact of each FOMC statement
on risk perception in bond markets.
2.1 General Econometric Representation
Let Yt be a vector of n economic and financial variables. A and Cj ∀ j > 1 are conformable
coefficient matrices, while ǫt is a vector of structural white noise shocks. Matrix A de-
notes the contemporaneous interactions among endogenous variables. The structural shocks
are orthogonal to each other and normalized to one standard deviation. Then the general
structural form of the VAR model is given by
AYt = Σ
p
j=1CjYt−j + ǫt (1)
The straightforward estimation of structural form VAR may incur the endogeneity issue.
Pre-multiplying both sides of the equation with A−1 derives the reduced form representation
Yt = Σ
p
j=1BjYt−j + ut (2)
where ut is the vector of reduced form residuals. Parameters in reduced form VAR can be
estimated by equation-by-equation ordinary least square regressions. Since the structural
shocks are of the concern, the reduced form residuals are related to the structural shocks in
the following mapping function
ut = Sǫt (3)
with Bj = A
−1Cj and S = A
−1. Matrix S is the mapping from structural shocks to reduced
form residuals. By normalizing structural shocks ǫt to an identity matrix, the reduced form
variance-covariance matrix is
Et[utu
′
t] = SS
′
= Σ (4)
Consider ypt ∈ Yt as the policy indicator and ǫ
p
t as the associated structural policy shock.
Then, let s (n×1) denote the column in matrix S that corresponds to the impact of structural
policy shocks ǫpt (1×1) on elements in the vector of reduced form shocks ut. Since our primary
question is how economic and financial variables in Yt respond to monetary policy shocks, we
thus need to estimate parameters in the following equation. We only identify the monetary
policy shocks and impose no restrictions on other structural parameters.
Yt = Σ
p
j=1BjYt−j + sǫ
p
t (5)
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The difficulty of identification lies in the estimation of the mapping vector s that is related
to monetary policy shocks. The reduced form residual of policy indicator upt is estimable via
OLS regression in the policy indicator equation, but it requires restrictions to identify the
portion of upt driven by structural monetary policy shocks and exogenous to other economic
shocks.
Identification by external instrument considers monetary policy surprises constructed
through an event study method in high-frequency data as the exogenous component of
monetary policy. Event-study monetary policy surprises are qualified as policy instruments
Zt if they are strongly correlated with monetary policy shocks ǫ
p
t (relevance condition), but
orthogonal to other structural shocks ǫqt (exogeneity condition).
E[Ztǫ
p
t
′] = 0 (6)
E[Ztǫ
q
t
′] 6= 0 (7)
The two-stage identification process is similar to the 2-stage least square regression in
univariate analyses. The reduced form residual in the policy equation upt is endogenously
related to other reduced form residuals uqt due to the contemporaneous interactions among
variables in Yt. In the first stage regression, we use externally identified monetary policy
surprises as policy instruments to tease out the component of upt affected by contemporaneous
monetary policy shocks ǫpt .
‘upt = γZt + ǫt (8)
In the second stage, we obtain the relationship between responses of other included
variables and that of policy indicator to a unit increase of monetary policy shocks by equation
(9). sq link the contemporary variation of non-policy variables uqt to a unit of monetary policy
shock ǫpt and s
p denote how the VAR residual in the policy indicator equation react to one
unit of ǫpt . Since the reduced form residual u
p
t may be partially endogenous to u
q
t , we use the
exogenous component γZt (uˆ
p
t ) derived from the first stage to acquire unbiased estimation
of relative changes of uqt to u
p
t in response of a unit increase of monetary policy shock
sq
sp
.
uqt =
sq
sp
uˆpt + et (9)
With the estimated s
q
sp
, reduced form residuals ut and the reduced form variance-covariance
matrix Σ, we thus derive the estimation of sp and sq.5
5See Appendix A for more details about the algorithm for identification.
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Importantly, this econometric framework imposes no restrictions that the policy indica-
tor must be a short-term rate, and that policy instrument should be a variable describing
behavior in the policy rate.
2.2 Identify Monetary Policy Shocks in the Risk-taking Channel
In the risk-taking channel, monetary policy shocks motivate adjustments of financial inter-
mediaries’ risk perception. To distinguish from the default risk which bears more relationship
with the operation in the private sector, the risk specified here is the interest rate risk6, akin
to the anticipated volatility associated with future monetary policy shocks in the long run.
Based on individuals’ risk interpretations of monetary policy announcements, those financial
intermediaries shall decide the volume of their lending (risk-taking) activities and term pre-
mium on their baseline long-term lending rates. For instance, a relative volatile monetary
policy environment may introduce additional uncertainty in banks’ investment decision, af-
fecting lending activities. Unexpected changes of the policy rate may fall short in identifying
monetary policy shocks in the risk-taking channel due to its lack of risk implication and the
loss of richer information content in FOMC statements besides policy rate movements.
We consider three criteria under relevance and exogeneity conditions for a policy instru-
ment to qualify in identifying policy shocks in the risk-taking channel. In terms of relevance
to monetary policy shocks, it should be adequately comprehensive to include the entire infor-
mation content of FOMC announcements and be confined to bonds markets as the Federal
Reserve primarily exerts impact on interest rates. On the point of exogeneity, it should be
exogenous to stances of the public who has no access to the Federal Reserve’s private infor-
mation. Thus, the captured movements are only sourced from the Federal Reserve’s private
information set. With an event study approach, we generate the time series of volatility
surprises which capture the risk-side implication of FOMC announcements for a represen-
tative long-term bond market. Section Six provides a detailed road map of generating this
risk-related policy instrument.
The equation (11) - (13) shows in detail how to use event study method to identify the
exogenous movements in perceived risk in daily data.
V OLt = d
FOMC
t [E1,tσ
p
t+30 − E0,tσ
p
t+30] (10)
where [σpt+30]
2 = σt+30(s
pǫpt )
2 + σt+30(s
qǫqt )
2 (11)
6Interest rate risk is defined as the chance that investments in bonds will suffer due to unexpected interest
rate changes with known distribution. Interest rate uncertainty is mainly referred to as the unpredictability
of monetary policy decisions.
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On the left-hand side of equation (11), a volatility surprise, V OLt, captures variation
in the 30-day expectation in volatility of the policy indicator induced by monetary policy
and unexpected by financial markets. The right-hand side of the equation demonstrates
the event study approach. The expectation operator E1 (and E0) denote the expectation
based on the information set before (and after) the release of an FOMC statement. The
volatility of policy indicator in the ensuring 30 days after the FOMC announcement is noted
as σpt+30. It is partitioned into two components respectively ascribed to different structural
shocks, i.e. monetary policy shocks and non-policy shocks. Given that the measuring scope
are principally identical for the two 30-day implied volatility shortly before and after an
announcement, We consider the 30 days in the volatility measurement unchanged. Let
dFOMCt be the time dummy for FOMC announcements; which equals 1 when there is an
FOMC announcement and, otherwise, equals zero.
We inherent the assumption from Wright (2012) that the information content of mone-
tary policy statements is the source of the higher volatility of monetary policy shocks σ(ǫpt )
on FOMC announcement days. This implies that the non-policy structural shocks ǫpt are
randomly distributed on the timeline and their contributions to the volatility of policy in-
dicator are stable shortly before and after one announcement. As the impact of non-policy
structural shocks is essentially canceled out when taking the difference in an event study
approach, we retain changes in the volatility of monetary policy shocks in volatility surprises
as sp is treated as a constant parameter. As shown in equation (13), volatility surprises indi-
cate variation, due to FOMC announcements, in the expected volatility of monetary policy
shocks. If the policy indicator is a long-term rate, then volatility surprises monitor changes
in the expected volatility of monetary policy shocks in the long run.
V OLt = s
pdFOMCt Et(∆σt+30(ǫ
p
t )|Ω1 − Ω0) (12)
With the assistance of volatility surprises, we combine the identification by external
instruments with identification by heteroskedasticity to identify monetary policy shocks in
the SVAR model.
Identification by heteroskedasticity is introduced by Rigobon (2003) and further applied
by Rigobon and Sack (2003), Rigobon and Sack (2004) and others. One strategy proposed
by Wright (2012) relies on the observation that, on the dates with FOMC announcements,
the variance of monetary policy shocks is different from that on the dates without announce-
ments.
Let σ1 and σ0 be the volatility of monetary policy shocks respectively in FOMC announce-
ment and non-announcement dates. And Σ1 and Σ0 are the variance-covariance matrices of
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reduced form errors estimated separately for those two circumstances. Vector s represents
how reduced form residuals react to a unit increase in structural monetary policy shocks ǫpt .
The assumption can be expressed by
Σ1 − Σ0 = ss
′σ21 − ss
′σ20 = ss
′(σ21 − σ
2
0) (13)
As Σ1 and Σ0 can be estimated via equation-by-equation OLS regressions and σ
2
1 − σ
2
0 is
assumed to be a constant, the vector s is estimable by a distance minimization function.
This identification is advantageous over the identification by external instruments in two
points. First, this approach is associated with the measurement of risk if considering changes
in the volatility or variance of monetary policy shocks in the context of interest rate risk.
This may be a probable approach to incorporate the risk factor into the identification of
monetary policy shocks. Second, it enables us to identify the impact of entire monetary
policy, rather than only account for policy rate changes. This approach does not require full
knowledge of how each component of monetary policy affects the volatility before analyzing
the influence of monetary policy in integral.
However, this heteroskedasticity approach falls short to our need in three aspects. First,
since the identification is achieved in daily data, the resulting monetary policy shocks are
unable to interfere with macroeconomic variables which are usually in monthly or even lower
frequency. Second, the varying volatility or variance on announcement days may not only
show the influence of monetary policy, but also reflects the pre-FOMC-announcement drift in
the volatility driven by the occurrence of FOMC events7. Monetary policy shocks identified
by the variance on announcement dates may not precisely reflect monetary policy stances.
Third, the realized volatility may not be a good measure of perceived risk, since the realized
volatility is settled and no longer risky for market participants.
To deal with those shortcomings, we combine the heteroskedasticity approach with the
external instrument method by three modifications on the former.
First, we allow heteroskedasticity among all FOMC announcement dates. Specifically,
instead of identifying the mapping vector s in a lump sum, we identify sp, the impact of a one-
unit monetary policy shock ǫpt on the policy indicator with the volatility surprise being the
instrumental variable. More accurate identification is achieved because volatility surprises
update changes in the volatility for each FOMC announcement relative to an adjacent non-
announcement date. In comparison, Wright (2012) draw attention to the different variances
for FOMC announcement and non-announcement dates. Furthermore, by converting the
7Please see the detail of pre-FOMC-announcement drift in Section Six.
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event-study time series of volatility surprises into the monthly one, we overcome the gap of
data frequency between event study time series and monthly VAR model.
Second, as to the policy instrument, we apply a 4-day time window in order to exclude
the impact of the event-driven, pre-FOMC-announcement drift of interest rate volatility and
retain the relevance of volatility surprises to monetary policy actions (please refer to Section
Six for detail).
Third, we select changes of near-term (i.e., 30-day) expectation in volatility, rather than
swings of actual volatility, to capture the heteroskedasticity. On the one hand, the realized
volatility contains no uncertainty to market participants and may deviate from the definition
of risk. On the other hand, changes in the expectation reflect more information in FOMC
statements than changes in actual volatility. The majority of dates for measuring volatility
before and after an announcement are overlapped. Changes in the expectation of volatility
take into account variations in expected returns in all days within the measuring scope.
Whereas, differences in actual volatility essentially compares the return of the last day with
that of the first day in the measuring range.
In practice, we identify monetary policy shocks through the varying expected volatility
of the policy indicator (i.e., the volatility surprise), given its implication for fluctuations in
future monetary policy shocks. This approach bears a strong theoretical connection with the
risk-taking channel. We attempt to investigate whether a monetary-policy-induced variation
in long-term interest rate risk perceived by financial markets affects the level of a long-term
real rate and, more importantly, whether it influences financial frictions, banks’ risk-taking
behavior, and real economic activity. In this venue, volatility surprises stimulate monetary-
policy-induced movements of the policy indicator.
We follow the identical procedure as the aforementioned 2-stage regressions. We consider
the volatility surprise identified via the event study method as the policy instrument and
run the first-stage regression as follow.
Monthly : upt = γV OLt + ǫt (14)
Then in the second stage, we estimate s
q
sp
, the reactions of uqt relative to u
p
t in response
of a unit increase of monetary policy shocks. The fitted value uˆpt is the component of u
p
t
responding to monetary policy shocks and is driven by varying expected volatility of future
monetary policy shocks in long term. The second-stage regressions in equation (14) show
that unexpected variation in the volatility expectation drives contemporaneous exogenous
14
movements of other endogenous variables.
Monthly : uqt =
sq
sp
uˆpt + et where uˆ
p
t = γV OLt (15)
Overall, monetary policy shocks in the risk-taking channel are identified through the
second-moment movement of a representative long-term rate and the entire information
content of FOMC statements. Besides, we make no redundant restrictions on other structural
parameters.
3 Data and Sample
Our sample ranges from January 2003 to January 2018, including 140 FOMC meetings and
the entire ZLB period.
In the SVAR model, we include four endogenous variables, such as the PCE chain-type
price index, the industrial production, a monetary policy indicator, and a measure of financial
frictions.
The PCE chain-type price index is a measure of prices of all domestic personal consump-
tion of final goods8. The Federal Reserve emphasizes its role in measuring price inflation
since it ”covers a wide range of household spending”9. The industrial production is a sensitive
indicator of production activities, and its data is available in monthly frequency. We follow
the practice of Gertler and Karadi (2015) and retain the measure of financial frictions, the
Gilchrist and Zakrajˇsek (2012) excess bond premium. The excess bond premium captures
the difference in yields between the corporate and Treasury bonds with identical maturity
after statistically purging the impact of expected corporate default risk. Empirically, it is
a viable indicator of the credit market sentiment and the degree of financial frictions in
financial markets.
We propose a long-term real interest rate, i.e., the 10-year Treasury inflation-protected
securities (TIPS) yield, as an alternative policy indicator. Hanson and Stein (2015) and
Nakamura and Steinsson (2018) suggest that TIPS yields reflect virtually all the responses
of nominal interest rates on FOMC dates to monetary policy surprises. Furthermore, a TIPS
yield is less susceptible to the price shock and more responsive to monetary policy actions,
measured by various monetary policy surprises, than the correspondent nominal rate. Table
1 shows the contemporary changes of 10-year real and nominal rates in response to mon-
8A detailed comparison between CPI and PCE price index is provided by McCully, C. P., et al. (2007).
”Comparing the consumer price index and the personal consumption expenditures price index.” Survey of
Current Business 87(11): 2633.
9See official website of the Federal Reserve: https://www.federalreserve.gov/faqs/economy 14419.htm
15
etary policy surprises and reduced form VAR residuals of non-policy variables. RES IP
and RES PCE are the VAR residuals of industrial production and PCE price index in our
baseline 4-variable VAR model with 10-year nominal or real rate being the policy indicator,
respectively. The statistics illustrates that changes in the 10-year nominal rate are highly
subjected to price fluctuations. Whereas, changes of the 10-year TIPS yield are more re-
sponsive to monetary policy surprises–respectively are the policy rate surprise and volatility
surprise which will be introduced shortly after–and innovations in output but are relatively
inactive to swings in the price level. This property of the TIPS yield helps us focus on the
effect of monetary policy, rather than on the reaction to the noisy price fluctuation. We
use the 10-year TIPS yield in the interest rate channel and the risk-taking channel in which
long-term rates are theoretically relevant. In comparison, to investigate the credit channel,
the policy indicator used in Gertler and Karadi (2015) is the one-year Treasury yield.
Table 1: The Contemporary Responds of 10-year Real or Nominal rate to Shocks
(1) (2)
∆10Y TIPS ∆10Y
VOL 0.071∗∗∗ 0.026
(0.023) (0.020)
PRATE 1.080∗∗ 0.992∗∗
(0.470) (0.436)
RES PCE 10.400 25.429∗∗
(6.990) (11.258)
RES IP −6.830∗ 2.046
(3.850) (2.102)
Observations 177 177
R2 0.173 0.080
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Note: HAC Robust standard errors in parentheses
We generate two event-study monetary policy surprises as the policy instruments. The
first monetary policy surprise, the policy rate surprise, is directly borrowed from Kuttner
(2001). It captures the changes of the spot-month federal funds future rate on the FOMC
announcement dates. It is a common practice that assesses exogenous monetary policy
actions in light of the Taylor rule. The only modification we make is to adjust the sample
period according to ours. The other monetary policy surprise that we innovate for the risk-
taking channel is the volatility surprise. We generate the volatility surprise by capturing
the unexpected change of near-term expectation in long-term rate volatility around each
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FOMC meeting announcement. We select the interest rate volatility of 10-year Treasury
bonds in order to match with the maturity of policy indicator. The volatility surprise
demonstrates monetary-policy-induced changes in the expected volatility of future monetary
policy shocks in the long run perceived by financial markets. In Section Six, we provide
a detailed procedure for producing the volatility surprise, including the selection of a time
window and the conversion to monthly time series. Both surprises are converted into monthly
time series to fit into the monthly SVAR model.
When setting the volatility surprise as the policy instrument, we are not intended to pre-
sume that the Federal Reserve attempts to control or manipulate expected volatility of an
interest rate. Instead, the Federal Reserve’s communication, such as communication styles,
languages in the summary of economic projections and more, may contribute to the exoge-
nous impact of monetary policy on financial markets. In the SVAR model, as unexpected by
economic agents other than the Federal Reserve, the influences of communication in FOMC
announcements constitute a portion of exogenous monetary policy shocks to the VAR sys-
tem. These effects thus should be incorporated to identify the monetary policy shocks. The
two monetary policy surprises demonstrate two distinctive and orthogonal dimensions of the
impact of monetary policy announcements, such as the influence on short rates level versus
the effects on long rate volatility. Another critical difference between the two monetary pol-
icy surprises is the measuring objects. The policy rate surprise lasers the focus on changes
in the policy rate, while the volatility surprise comprehensively evaluates monetary policy
announcements in terms of the risk implication. In the model, we stimulate monetary pol-
icy shocks with the policy rate surprise in the credit channel and the interest rate channel.
Both channels are characterized by a Taylor rule type of monetary policy reaction function.
On the contrary, the risk-taking channel accepts a broader definition of monetary policy.
Therefore, the volatility surprise is ideal for initiating the monetary policy shocks in the
risk-taking channel in order to investigate the risk-side monetary policy transmission.
3.1 First-stage Regression and the Relevance of External Instruments
A common issue of the estimations with instrumental variables is the weak instrument.
Specifically, if the covariance between an endogenous regressor and its instrumental variable
is low, the IV estimator is severely biased toward the OLS estimator. In this case, the
instrumental variable is considered as a weak instrument. We adopt Stock and Yogo (2005)
criteria (a larger than 10 F-statistics) to determine the relevance of instrumental variables.
In various settings, the policy indicator is either the one-year Treasury yield or 10-year TIPS
yield. And the policy instrument is either the volatility surprise or policy rate surprise. In
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the first-stage regression, we regress the reduced form VAR residual of either policy indicator
on each monetary policy surprise. Table 6 shows the results. The F-statistics is based on
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) standard deviation.
Table 2: The Results of the First-stage Regression
Risk−taking Interest Rate Credit
10Y TIPS(1) 10Y TIPS(1) 1Y 1Y
VOL 0.058∗∗∗ 0.033
(0.012) (0.016)
PRATE 0.983∗∗∗ 0.803∗∗∗
(0.271) (0.146)
Obs. 178 178 178 178
Robust F -Stat. 23.96 13.12 30.17 4.17
Note: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
The dependent variable is the reduced form VAR residual of the policy indicator specified
in the second row. VOL and PRATE are the volatility surprise and policy rate surprise
converted into monthly time series.
In the models which use the one-year Treasury yield as the policy indicator, the coefficient
of policy rate surprise is significant at a high multitude. This indicates that unexpected
policy rate changes are a strong instrumental variable for the monetary policy projected on
short-term rates. In contrast, volatility surprises are barely relevant with shifts in short-term
rates. Overall, reaction of the one-year yield to monetary policy surprises is instantaneous.
When considering the 10-year real rate as the policy indicator, the volatility surprise and
policy rate surprise are both strong instruments with higher than 10 F-statistics. However,
the strong relevance is significant between the lagged VAR residual of 10-year TIPS yield
and the two monetary policy surprises. It may be because these monetary policy surprises
have a more persistent impact on long-term real rate than what they do on short-term rates.
This lagged matching can also be attributed to the conversion of monetary policy surprises
from daily to monthly time series, a process in which unavoidably extend the persistence
of surprises. Matching the lagged residual of policy indicator with current monetary policy
surprises may shorten the time interval between monetary policy actions and reactions of
financial markets.
Concern about the non-contemporaneous matching is that historical values of the policy
indicator seem predictive for volatility surprises. Thus, identified monetary policy shocks
might reflect a systematic component of monetary policy. However, we find no evidence to
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bolster this argument in the daily date analysis and Granger causality test (please refer to
Appendix B).
We also report that the volatility surprise is more significant as an instrumental variable
for the long-term real rate than the policy rate surprise is. The explanation power is higher
as well. This evidence suggests the difficulty of merely applying the policy rate or short-term
rates to explain the more volatile fluctuations in long-term rates.
In summary, we construct a 4-variable SVAR model with a financial variable indicating
financial frictions. Departing from the stylized short-term rates, we adopt a long-term real
rate to indicate the monetary policy impact to the whole yield curve. To properly identify the
monetary policy shocks, we generate a new high-frequency, event-study measure of perceived
risk in long-term rate. As a result, we take the risk-side impact of FOMC statements on
long-term rates into the account of the measurement of monetary policy. To be comparable
with the literature, we retain the policy rate surprise to denote the monetary policy stance
consistent with the Taylor rule. In the next section, we correspond the first three significant
combinations of policy instruments and indicators with three mainstream monetary policy
transmission channels and evaluate their effectiveness in transmitting to the economy.
4 Empirical Results
4.1 Review of the Credit Channel
At the beginning of this section, I review the empirical results in Gertler and Karadi (2015)
since their work lays the econometric foundation for this paper and evaluates the validity
of the credit channel. They propose the SVAR model with identification through external
instrument for the study of monetary policy transmission. They follow the convention in
the monetary transmission literature and make two assumptions. First, monetary policy
only directly affects the short end of the yield curve. Second, monetary policy is measured
by the federal funds rate or its close alternatives, like Eurodollar rates. In practice, they
use 1-year Treasury yield as the policy indicator to reflect current policy rate changes and
forward guidance. To capture the exogenous monetary policy actions, they use the policy
rate surprise as the policy instrument.
Their result illustrates that a change in short-term market rate motivated by a shift in
policy rate drives fluctuations of the excess bond premium and, in turn, the lagged move-
ments of output. They argue that a frictional financial market is crucial to the propagation of
monetary policy, corresponding to the central role of external financing premium in the credit
channel proposed by Bernanke and Gertler (1995). In the credit channel, a contractionary
19
change of policy rate, as claimed by Bernanke and Gertler (1995), both affect borrowers’ bal-
ance sheet quality and lenders’ capital availability. The variation in both avenues eventually
influences the spread between the costs of external and internal financing. Bernanke et al.
(1999) further develop this channel into a financial accelerator mechanism by incorporating
general equilibrium modeling and contract theories in a business cycle framework. The im-
pulse responses of the excess bond premium and output support the effective transmission
through the credit channel. In short, the theoretical and empirical work leads to the same
argument that the policy rate change propagates to the economy through, though may not
exclusively through, a financial accelerator mechanism.
The unsolved question for this model is whether long-term interest rates play a role in
the transmission. Exhaustively, there are three hypotheses given the validity of Gertler
and Karadi (2015) finding. First, monetary policy only affects short-term rates, and long-
term rates are unresponsive. Second, monetary policy only influences movements of short-
term rates which in turn drives sways of long-term rates. Third, monetary policy affects
short- and long-term rates individually in different mechanisms. The abundant empirical
evidence of the significant impact of monetary policy on long-term rates rejects the first
hypothesis (Gu¨rkaynak et al. (2005),Wright (2012), Hanson and Stein (2015)). However, no
empirical proof has been found for the second and third hypotheses from the monetary policy
transmission perspective. We test them by introducing a long-term real rate as the policy
indicator into our VAR model. Furthermore, if any of the two latter hypotheses are true, we
test whether they are blind alleys in transmission. In other words, we monitor whether the
impact of monetary policy on the yield curve can eventually influence economic aggregates.
4.2 Testing the Interest Rate Channel: Long-term Real Rate as a New Policy Indicator
The Keynesian interest rate channel, corresponding to the aforementioned second hypothesis,
is almost the textbook view of the monetary policy transmission mechanism in which long-
term rates play a role. It may be partitioned into two steps, such as the transmission to the
yield curve and that to the economy. The former, in general, characterizes three suppositions.
First, the monetary policy is measured by changes in the policy rate. Second, changes
in short-term rates pass through to long-term rates. Third, nominal and real rates move
synchronously due to the sticky price setting in Keynesian-type models. Statistically, we
test the validity of those three hypotheses jointly by observing whether policy rate surprises
can stimulate fluctuations in a long-term real rate.
In terms of the second proposition, the literature mentions two avenues regarding trans-
mission from short to long rates. On the one hand, a shift in the short rate leads the market
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to adjust the expected path of future short rates according to the expectations hypothesis of
term structure. On the other hand, more recent researches, e.g., Hanson and Stein (2015),
indicate that unexpected changes in the policy rate affect term premia on distant forward
rates. Since we focus on attesting whether the pass-through from short to long rates is
effective, we integrate the effects in both avenues.
In terms of the transmission to economic activity, the interest rate channel assumes a
cost-of-capital effect typically discussed in the neoclassical theory of investment. Accordingly,
changes in the cost of capital affect real activities through their impact on spendings on
durable goods and fixed investment.
To examine the monetary transmission in the interest rate channel, we consider the
10-year TIPS yield as the policy indicator, and adopt the policy rate surprise to identify
monetary policy shocks.
In the first stage regression, if the transmission to the yield curve is valid, the coefficient
in the first stage regression should be positive and statistically significant. It is confirmed by
our results in Table 2. Furthermore, the F-statistics is significantly higher than 10. In the
second stage, we estimate the mapping vector between monetary policy shocks and reduced
form residuals of endogenous variables under the restriction that monetary policy affects
long-term rates primarily through variation in the policy rate.
Figure 2 shows impulse responses of endogenous variables to “monetary policy shocks
identified in the interest rate channel”. In comparison, we also show the impulse responses
from the conventional Cholesky identification scheme in the right column. Both columns
show impulse responses to a one standard deviation structural monetary policy shock. In
the right column, the impulse responses in the VAR model with the conventional Cholesky
identification are insignificant for all variables. In the left column, monetary policy shocks are
identified as the systematic movements of a long-term real rate in responses to unexpected
policy rate changes on FOMC announcement dates. Influenced by a contractionary policy
shock, the price level gradually slides for roughly eight months and remains at a low level
for an extended period. The reaction of output is silent to this shock. The confidence band
is wide. The muted response in production provides opposing evidence to the cost-of-capital
effect in the neoclassical theory of investment and implies the failure in transmitting to the
economy in the interest rate channel. Furthermore, the typically countercyclical excess bond
premium behaves abnormally. It declines right after a tightening policy shock but quickly
recovers to zero. It may be interpreted by a lagged pass-through from the cost of capital
to lending rates. Banks may take in the long-term rate spike, leading to an instantaneous
reduction of the excess bond premium. Within a quarter, banks seem eventually pass through
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Figure 2: The impulse responses to the monetary policy shocks identified in the interest
rate channel
the exogenous increase of cost of capital to borrowers and thus the excess bond premium
return to a flat response.
4.3 The Risk-taking Channel: the Volatility Surprise as the New Instrument
Risk is a critical factor for asset pricing in finance studies, but it is less explored at the
aggregate level, especially in the studies of monetary policy (related work includes Bekaert
et al. (2013), Baker et al. (2016), Husted et al. (2017)). Borio and Zhu (2012) first pro-
posed the risk-taking channel in monetary policy transmission. Specifically, the monetary
policy may affect risk perceptions or risk tolerance of financial intermediaries and then have
a first-order impact on economic activity. Empirically, this paper is the first attempt to
find an appropriate measure that specifically accounts for influences of monetary policy on
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aggregate risk perception, especially the risk attitude in the bond market where monetary
policy primarily exert impact on.
We use the 10-year TIPS yield to indicate the monetary policy actions and the volatil-
ity surprise to instrument the identification of monetary policy shocks. Importantly, the
volatility surprise incorporates the impact of all the components of monetary policy, notably
including effects of unconventional monetary policy tools. Monetary policy shocks in the
risk-taking channel are identified as variation in a long-term real rate driven by monetary-
policy-induced changes in perceived fluctuations of monetary policy shocks in the long run.
For instance, if financial markets expect less volatility of monetary policy shocks in the future
ten years due to an FOMC announcement, we consider this monetary policy as expansionary.
Figure 3: The impulse responses to monetary policy shocks identified in risk-taking channel
The Figure 3 shows the impulse responses to monetary policy shocks identified in the
risk-taking channel. A one-standard-deviation contractionary monetary policy shock leads
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to a significant and persistent drop in price level, a similar result as the “interest rate
channel” model. What interests us is the strong hump-shape reactions of the excess bond
premium and output. Under a tightening shock transmitting through perceived risk, the
credit environment immediately aggravates, and excess credit costs hike up for ten basis
point for approximately a year. The same shock also leads to 50 basis point decline in
output. Additionally, we observe close interaction between financial frictions and industrial
production. The trough of production coincides with the time point when the response of
excess bond premium is indistinguishable from zero.
Our results suggest the viability of the risk-taking channel. FOMC statements somehow
influence the expected volatility of future monetary policy shocks in the long run. This aspect
of monetary policy shows strong implication for long-term real rates, financial frictions, and
real activity.
5 Discussion
5.1 Credit and Interest Rate Channels: Financial Accelerator or Cost-of-Captial Effect
We compare our results in the interest rate channel model with those in Gertler and Karadi
(2015), whose distinction from ours centers on the selection of policy indicators. They select
one-year Treasury yield as the policy indicator and generate sensible impulse responses of
the excess bond premium and output to monetary policy shocks. When using 10-year real
yield as the policy indicator, those responses are muted.
The multidimensionality of the monetary policy may contribute to the distinctive im-
pulse responses. Monetary policy consists of the headline figure and the FOMC statement.
The headline figure in most cases is the policy rate target and is communicated with the
public by an unambiguous, narrow target range of the federal funds rate. It may domi-
nate the impact of monetary policy on short rates, but it could be reluctant to represent
the whole influence on longer-term rates. Meanwhile, an FOMC announcement incorporates
more diversified information, such as the FOMC’s Summary of Economic Projections (SEP),
forward guidance, LSAPs, and other details of open market operations. Those information
contents and associated operations influence short rates as well as long rates. Since those
new policies affect the slope of the term structure of interest rates, Eberly et al. (2019) refer
to those new elements in the current monetary policy framework as slope policies. Slope
policies are thus differentiated from the traditional level policy that sets the current level of
the Federal funds rate. For instance, Gagnon et al. (2011),Rosa (2012), Swanson (2015) and
others indicate that LSAPs have much greater influence to long-term Treasury yields than
to short-term yields.
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Gertler and Karadi (2015) identify the impact of policy rate changes on a short-term
rate as the exogenous (monetary policy) shocks and focus on the transmission via short-
term rates. It is a proper identification scheme since adjustments in Reserve’s operations on
short-term rates. Whereas, the policy impacts on long-term rates are unrevealed in the black
box of transmission. Their results may suggest that effects of unexpected policy rate hikes
on the short end of the yield curve are adequate to result in credit crunch and shrinkage of
production. But this model has no access to whether, and how, a long-term interest rate
plays a role in this transmission.
When considering long-term rates as a node of monetary policy transmission, their link-
age with policy rate changes seems marginally drive economic activity. We delve into the
literature in search of theoretical or institutional clues for the muted responses of the excess
bond premium and output in the interest rate channel model.
The unresponsiveness of the excess bond premium may attribute to two explanations.
Financial intermediaries may passively adjust their expectation in future short-term rates
and their baseline long-term lending rates when encountering exogenous policy rate changes.
Hence, an increase in the cost of capital due to a policy rate change may pass through to
borrowers. In a competitive market, a bank may not have an incentive to augment excess
credit premium on baseline long-term rates as long as the information of the expected path
of future short rates is publicly available in financial markets. In fact, the Federal Reserve
periodically releases the estimated expected yield and term premium data of Treasury bonds
with a full spectrum of maturities based on approaches in Kim and Wright (2005) and Adrian
et al. (2013). This information offers limited arbitrage space for a bank to implement a
heterogeneous premium on baseline rates. Another explanation is a story of yield-searching
investor proposed by Hanson and Stein (2015), among others. This story aims to justify
why unexpected policy rate changes are highly associated with significant changes in term
premia on distant real forward rates. This short-lived variation in term premia due to
demand shocks in the bond market is well observed not only by empirical research, but also
in the institutional behaviors of commercial banks (Stein (1989)). Responses of the excess
bond premium may confirm that these demand shocks in financial securities trading are too
trivial and transitory to affect banks’ lending decisions. In combine, the muted reaction of
the excess bond premium may be justified from the perspectives of interest rate pass-through
and short-lived drifts in term premia. However, our results may be too preliminary for us to
make a preference in those explanations.
Contradicting to the cost of capital effect in the neoclassical theory of investment, our
evidence shows that fluctuations in a long-term real rate induced by policy rate changes
do not lead to variation in output. This finding is consistent with Blinder and Maccini
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(1991), Chirinko (1993), among others, which find the difficulty in identifying a quantita-
tively significant effect of the neoclassical cost-of-capital variable in ”interest-rate sensitive”
components of aggregate spending. Whereas, due to the multidimensionality of monetary
policy, it should be premature to conclude that monetary policy fails to transmit to the
economy.
Additionally, the quiet response of output in the interest rate channel reconfirms the
necessity to not only consider policy rate movements, but also investigate the entire infor-
mation content of FOMC statements. The FOMC statements may include some components
of monetary policy other than the policy rate targeting that influence both long-term rates
and economic activity. Thus, by identifying the risk-taking channel via the volatility surprise,
we suggest a more comprehensive identification strategy of monetary policy shocks.
Another noteworthy observation is that the responses of excess bond premium and output
are synchronized. In fact, it is the case for all three channels. For example, in Gertler and
Karadi (2015) model, a hike of excess credit costs accompanies a decline in output. In
the interest rate channel model, the unchanged excess bond premium is followed by a flat
response of production. It seems that the financial frictions, rather than the cost of capital,
are a critical driving factor of economic activity. This finding strongly supports financial
accelerator models first proposed by Bernanke et al. (1999). They feature amplifier effects of
credit market frictions on monetary policy transmission. Their claim is in accordance with
our results. The hike of excess credit costs demonstrates the aggravation in information
asymmetry and the increase of agency costs in the credit generating process, leading to
widespread real effects. Meanwhile, our evidence opposes the Modigliani and Miller (1958)
Theorem, which implies that financial structure is irrelevant to real economic outcomes.
Consequently, flat impulse responses of financial frictions and output to policy shocks in
the interest rate channel lead us to explore the content of monetary policy beyond policy
rate changes.
5.2 Interest Rate and Risk-taking Channels: A More Comprehensive Identification Strategy
We notice that systematic changes of a long-term rate responding to policy rate decisions
do not trigger sways of the excess bond premium and output. Whereas, changes in the
long-term real rate caused by shifts in perceived interest rate risk does.
Campbell et al. (2012) and Nakamura and Steinsson (2018) demonstrate that market
participants may update their expectations about economic fundamentals in response to
Federal Reserve’s announcements. The Federal Reserve also signal information about the
state of the economy to the public (Romer and Romer, 2000; Melosi, 2016). These effects
26
may be sourced from the private information held by the Federal Reserve and exogenous to
financial markets. In order to evaluate the exogenous impact of entire information content in
FOMC announcements, we do not specially tease out these effects in the volatility surprise
and instead incorporate them in the monetary policy shock identification. Therefore, facing a
policy shock stimulated by a volatility surprise, financial intermediaries’ update of economic
prospects may influence their perception in future monetary policy actions. Thus lead to
variation in the excess bond premium.
Furthermore, we conjecture that monetary policy may have a more significant impact on
the supply of long-term capital than the demand. The cost-of-capital effect focuses on the
demand side in credit markets. For firms’ long-term investment decisions, fluctuations in the
cost of capital may be too transitory to be considered. Moreover, capital adjustment costs
may take an additional toll on firms’ frequently adjustment of capital stocks if they adopt
a cost-oriented investment strategy. As a result, firms may not be cost-efficient in closely
tracking borrowing costs and adjusting long-term investments accordingly. The investigation
of the risk-taking channel provides us with crucial insight into the supply side of long-term
capital. Financial intermediaries may be aware of variation in the volatility of monetary
policy shocks. An unexpected soar of the volatility may indicate the increasing difficulty in
interest rate forecasting and the additional provision for potential interest losses. These real
costs may render banks with incentives to add an excess premium on baseline lending rates
and shrink risk-taking behavior. Our results demand further exploration and theoretical
explanation in the real impact of second-moment movements in interest rates.
Another noteworthy finding is that, in both models, the price is well behaved without
demonstrating the price puzzle. This result suggests that movements in the price level bear
closer relationship with changes in interest rates than with the particular policy tools driving
those interest rate changes. In both models, it seems that innovation in long-term real rate
stimulates variation in the price, regardless of the components of monetary policy that trigger
this innovation. Comparing with the price responses in the Gertler and Karadi (2015) “credit
channel” model, the price level responds more rapidly to innovations in long-term rates than
those in short-term rates. It takes approximately two years for the price to distinguishably
react to the policy shocks identified in the movement of short-term rate. In contrast, it takes
much less time for the price responding to shocks identified in the long rate. This finding has
two implications. From one perspective, it seems that the policy transmission from short-
to long-term rates is not as instant as suggested by the expectations hypothesis. Otherwise,
the price should behave the same in two models without the difference in lagged effects.
From another aspect, our results may demonstrate a conflict for the Fed using a short-term
interest rate to target the long-run inflation. Inflation targeting denotes that monetary policy
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is conducted with a long-run target of inflation (detailed discussed by Svensson (1999a,b)).
Supposed a monetary authority adopt a short-term rate, such as the funds rate, as the main
instrument for inflation targeting but inflation is more responsive to changes in long-term
rates, then the effectiveness of monetary policy may be discounted.
5.3 Credit and Risk-taking Channels: All Roads Lead to Rome
Monetary policy shocks identified in the credit channel and the risk-taking channel both
invoke the hump-shape reactions of the excess bond premium and output. However, the
transmission mechanisms are different. The credit channel identifies the monetary policy
shocks as variation in a short-term rate caused by unexpected policy rate changes. In
contrast, the risk-taking channel defines monetary policy shocks as movements in a long-
term real rate induced by the FOMC-statement-driven changes in risk perceived for long-
term interest rates.
One critical question here is how the transmissions of monetary policy through the two
ends of the yield curve relate to each other. If they are relatively independent of each
other, it would be appropriate to adopt different mechanisms for stimulating policy-induced
movements in short- and long-term rates. Otherwise, policy rate changes may be sufficient to
measure monetary policy in all transmission channels, supporting a policy reaction function
akin to Taylor rules. We run the following regression to investigate whether a policy rate
surprise can explain the contemporaneous volatility surprise. Thus, we may infer whether
the impact of monetary policy on short- and long-term rates are interrelated.
V OLt = α+ βPrate
−
t + γPrate
+
t + ǫt (16)
We use monthly time series rather than the event study time series, which are only
consisted of FOMC events, to include all the data points on the time axis, and avoid the
data selection bias. It is necessary because the intervals between any two FOMC meetings
are irregular, especially when some unscheduled meetings are taken into account. V OLt
is the monthly volatility surprise and Pratet is the monthly policy rate surprise. Prate
−
t
records unexpected policy rate drops and notes zero for FOMC meetings with sudden policy
rate hikes. As the opposite case, Prate+t records unexpected positive changes of the policy
rate and takes zero when an opposite change incurs. As to the endogeneity issue, we assume a
unidirectional causality from a policy rate surprise to the contemporaneous volatility surprise.
This design is because an FOMC announcement takes precedence over the reaction of the
financial market. The monetary authority must wait until the next FOMC meeting to change
the policy rate target in order to address the current period volatility surprise.
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Table 3 shows a non-linear relationship between a policy rate surprise and a volatility
surprise. An unexpected policy rate cut is associated with a negative volatility surprise,
indicating that an expansionary policy rate change is likely to be effective in reducing the
perceived risk in long-term interest rates. On the contrary, an unexpected increase in the
policy rate is uncorrelated with volatility surprises. This asymmetric relationship alone is
worthwhile for further exploration. It may be associated with the insurance effect of mone-
tary policy. If the primary goal of monetary policy is to cope with the downside economic
risk, an expansionary monetary policy may curtails the public’s negative economic outlook
more than an identical-magnitude contractionary policy would aggravate the pessimistic
prospect (Borio and Zhu, 2012). Overall, the impact of a policy rate movement on its cor-
responding volatility surprise is trivial since the R squared is less than 0.03. Furthermore,
policy rate changes are far from being a determinant of volatility surprises as the F-statistics
(2.64) is much less than the criteria of 10.
Table 3: The Explanatory Power of a Policy Rate Surprise on a contemporaneous Volatility
Surprise
VOL
C 0.010
(0.029)
NEG PRATE 2.341∗∗∗
(0.843)
POS PRATE 0.155
(3.320)
Observations 188
R2 0.029
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Note: HAC Robust standard errors in parentheses
The low explanatory power of policy rate surprises on volatility surprises suggests the
weak connection between monetary policy transmission mechanisms through the short and
long ends of the yield curve to the economy.
In brief, we notice that monetary policy affects short-term rates through operations and
guidance on the policy rate, while influences long-term rates via altering the perceived risk
of long-term interest rates. Both channels induce variation in financial frictions and, in
turn, lagged adjustments of output. At last, the systematic component of long-term rates
in response to policy rate changes is significant but does not contribute to the dynamics of
economic activity.
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6 Construction of the Volatility Surprise
The generating procedure of the volatility surprise is crucial to our identification of the
monetary policy shocks in the risk-taking channel. However, technical details of the process
may divert readers from our empirical results in monetary policy transmission. Thus, after
presenting our findings, we set up the following section to discuss our practice in the event
study of the risk-side impact of monetary policy in high-frequency data.
6.1 Event Study of Monetary Policy Impact on Interest Rate Volatility
The methodology of generating the volatility surprise should be consistent with the the-
oretical model in the risk-taking channel. The risk-taking channel implies three required
properties for the volatility surprise that are associated with the exogeneity and relevance
conditions for policy instruments. First is exogeneity. It should be exogenous from the
perspective of financial markets which have no access to the private information set of the
Federal Reserve. Thus, the volatility surprise may not be obtained from the Federal Re-
serve; instead, it could be collected through massive data in financial markets. Second is
inclusiveness. It may reflect the integrated risk-side impact of entire information content
in FOMC statements, instead of merely concerning influences of policy rate changes. The
third is relevance. It should bear a close relationship with interest rate/ bond markets since
monetary policy primarily intends to affect these markets. In short, the goal is to identify
the impact of the entire information content in FOMC announcements on the interest rate
risk perceived by bond markets.
Our event study approach stems from Kuttner (2001). He applies a 30-minute or one-day
time window around each FOMC announcement on near-term federal funds rate futures to
capture exogenous monetary policy actions. This method is widely employed for studying
the effects of discrete events or news releases, such as Gu¨rkaynak et al. (2005), Campbell
et al. (2012) and more. In general, the event-study approach captures market price changes
of financial assets and their derivatives, like futures and options, within a small time win-
dow around FOMC meetings to quantify the influence of information content of FOMC
announcements.
Event study methods fit in our purpose in three aspects. First, it considers an FOMC
announcement as a whole and enable us to evaluate the impact of various tools or components
of monetary policy within one measure like policy rate changes or variation in interest rate
volatility. Whereas, this convenience also constitutes a challenge to the identification of
monetary policy shocks. It is essential to impose structural assumption on why an event
study time series captures, entire or a dimension of, monetary policy. Second, it incurs no
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model uncertainty, as it is not nested to an economic model. Third, it is compatible with the
irregularity of FOMC meeting dates. In each year, FOMC meetings are not held on the same
dates. With the event study applied on high frequency (daily) data, we accurately match
the timing of each monetary policy announcement with its correspondent second-moment
movement of the interest rate.
The main differences between the event study constructed for the volatility surprise and
Kuttner (2001) approach are that we consider the expected volatility of a long rate as the
event study object, and that we utilize a wider (i.e. 4-day) time window to capture exogenous
movements.
6.2 The Implied Volatility of 10-year Teasury
We extract the risk of long-term interest rates perceived by bond markets from the daily
time series of 30-day option-implied volatility of 10-year Treasury-Note future price (short
for “TYVIX index”) obtained from Cboe Options Exchange (Cboe). The TYVIX index
measures the annualized expectation in the 30-day standard deviation of the 10-year T-note
30-day futures price implied by market-traded futures and options prices. It is calculated
via Black-Sholes options pricing model by assuming no arbitrary opportunities in options
markets. The TYVIX index indicates the implied volatility of the 10-year Treasury yield as
Treasury bond prices are inversely mapped to Treasury yields ceteris paribus.
Given the TYVIX index is denoted as a percentage of the futures price, it is influenced
by changes in the futures price of 10-year Treasury note. To make a sensible comparison of
the volatility at different time points, we multiply the TYVIX index with the spot-month
futures price of 10-year T-note. Thus denote the TYVIX index in basis points of spot-month
10-year T-note futures price (Swanson, 2006). As a result, the varying T-note futures price
level does not affect our measure.
Given that the 10-year Treasury yield is the representative long-term interest rate received
most extensive attention in financial markets, we set it as the long-term rate, following the
practice of Wright (2012), Hanson and Stein (2015) and others. We select implied volatility
of the 10-year nominal rate to represent our measure of the volatility of long-term rates
primarily with an intention to match the maturity of the policy indicator of our choice10.
Figure 4 shows the TYVIX in basis point. It soars to a peak during the onset of the
financial crisis and experiences a gradual decline during the ZLB period. There are some
10Merrill Lynch provides an options volatility estimate index, the MOVE index. It is the yield curve
weighted index of the 30-day options-implied volatility of 2-, 5-, 10- and 30-year bond prices. We adopt
TYVIX index instead because it only measures fluctuations in the 10-year Treasury bond market and enable
us to focus on the role of long-term rates in monetary transmission.
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Figure 4: The Option-implied 30-day Volatility of 10-year T-note Future (Basis Point)
turbulences in the aftermath of the period. Notably, the two peaks of TYVIX index are
respectively coincided with two local troughs of the federal funds rate in August 2003 and
at the outset of the ZLB period in December 2008. This phenomenon indicates the cease
of expansionary monetary policy paths may stimulate the implied volatility of long-term
interest rate.
The 30-day measuring horizon of the TYVIX index facilitates the event study on FOMC
announcements. We seek to isolate the impact of each monetary policy announcement from
the influence of the policy announcement in the ensuing meeting11. A too wide measuring
horizon makes the impact of several FOMC meetings overlapped in one volatility surprise.
The 30-day measuring window on TYVIX index pragmatically enables the isolation for most
FOMC meetings.
The FOMC of the Federal Reserve holds eight scheduled meetings per year and publicly
announces new actions from deliberation at the end of each meeting. Time intervals between
any two contiguous scheduled FOMC meetings range from one to two months. We select the
30-day length for calculating the volatility so that the effect of one event is shielded from
being polluted by the expectation of monetary policy in the next FOMC announcement,
which is more than 30-day apart. This property enables us to focus on the undergoing
FOMC announcement and capture its impact independently.
11Some monetary policy tools may have extended implications on future policy decisions, such as forward
guidance. We evaluate this forward-looking impact through investigating movements in a long-term rate and
its volatility, rather than extending the measuring horizon of the volatility.
32
An exception of this separation is for unscheduled FOMC meetings. The FOMC “may
also hold unscheduled meetings as necessary to review economic and financial develop-
ments”12. In our sample, 20 out of 140 FOMC meetings were unscheduled. Admittedly,
intervals between some scheduled and unscheduled meetings are shorter than 30 days. How-
ever, they may not seriously detriment to the isolation aforementioned. On the one hand,
as those meetings are unscheduled, the scheduled FOMC meetings preceding them shall not
expect them ex-ante. Thus, an unscheduled FOMC meeting may not pollute the volatility
surprise generated in its preceding scheduled meeting. On the other hand, an unscheduled
meeting aims to “review” the announced monetary policy in its precedent scheduled meeting
and does not officially provide forward-looking information such as summary of economic
projections and forward guidance. We attribute changes of the TYVIX index around an
unscheduled meeting to its newly announced statement, rather than to changes in the ex-
pectation of future monetary policy actions in an ensuing FOMC meeting less than 30 days
apart.
In all, the 30-day measuring horizon, to the maximum extent, enables us to focus on the
impact of one FOMC statement in each volatility surprise.
6.3 The 4-day Time Window
The state-of-art identification assumption for event studies is that variation in a target finan-
cial variable within an adequately narrow time window around each FOMC announcement
may not be contaminated by noisy economic news. Therefore, it is solely attributed to
the exogenous impact of monetary policy. However, we depart from this popular Kuttner
(2001) approach and consider a 4-day time window instead to control for the pre-FOMC-
announcement drift in volatility. Specifically, we notice a prominent pre-FOMC-event drift
of the TYVIX index in basis points, which mainly due to the short-term trading activities
before each FOMC event, rather than due to monetary policy actions13. We find that this
drift introduces more noise to the measurement than the inclusion of economic news in a
relatively wide window. The 4-day time window is a feasible way to preclude this volatility
drift.
12Cited from the website of Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
https://www.federalreserve.gov/faqs/about 12844.htm
13Lucca and Moench (2015) first introduce this concept for financial assets yields.
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Figure 5: Averaged TYVIX Index from -7D to +7D of FOMC Decisions (Basis Point).
In Figure 5, we plot the TYVIX in basis point on 15 days around a “typical” FOMC an-
nouncement, averaging data around all FOMC meetings from 2003:1 to 2018:1. The 15 days
are seven days before, the announcement date, and seven days after an announcement).14
Before an FOMC meeting, the TYVIX in basis point, on average, accumulates consecu-
tively since four days before the announcement and then quickly ease back on the announce-
ment date. This drift may be analogous to the fixed effect of FOMC events. It might not
be relevant to the information content of monetary policy as this drift happens before a
”typical” FOMC announcement.
We further investigate the institutional mechanism of this pre-FOMC-event drift in the
volatility that roughly starts from 4 days prior to an FOMC announcement. We find its
association with the timing of an FOMC announcement in a week. In Table 4, we list the
weekday distribution of FOMC announcement dates. In the whole sample from 2003 to
2018, the majority of FOMC decisions (92%) are announced on Tuesday, Wednesday, and
Thursday. Four days before those weekdays are respectively Friday, Saturday and Sunday.
As weekends are non-trading days for major exchanges, the data on Saturdays and Sundays
are identical with closing quotes on the nearest precedent Fridays. Therefore, the TYVIX
data in four days before the 92% of FOMC announcements points to closing quotes on
Fridays in preceding weeks. In other words, the 4-day time window essentially takes the
difference of the ending quote on Friday preceding one announcement and the ending quote
on the announcement date.
14We use actual dates rather than trading dates in Figure 5, but our data is recorded only on trading days.
Therefore, our data source fills the empty data points of weekends and holidays with the nearest precedent
trading day data. For example, the data input for Saturday and Sunday is the same as the input for Friday.
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Table 4: Weekday Convention of FOMC Announcements
Mon Tue Wed thu Fri Sat Sun Total
Sample Counts 5 40 81 10 3 1 1 140
Percent 4% 28% 57% 7% 2% 1% 0% 100%
However, why do Fridays before announcement weeks become turning points of the
TYVIX index? Chordia et al. (2001) among others investigate weekday effects of trad-
ing activities and indicate that Fridays often feature a significant decrease in trading volume
and liquidity. Chen and Singal (2003) and Jones and Shemesh (2010) address a “Friday
effect” with the reduction in demand and price of call and put options due to the downside
risk of holding securities during weekends. The TYVIX index is calculated with the Treasury
note options prices via Black-Sholes non-arbitrage formula. Therefore, decline in demand
for call and put options leads to a lower figure of the TYVIX index on Fridays.
To verify the relationship between the pre-FOMC-announcement drift in the volatility
and the Friday effect, in Figure 6, we further show time-averaged fluctuations in the TYVIX
index in basis point for announcements on different weekdays. No matter which day (a
Tuesday, Wednesday or Thursday) an FOMC statement is released, the TYVIX index reaches
the trough in the preceding Friday. In the announcement week, trading volume and liquidity
in options markets resume from the low point. This pattern suggests that the pre-FOMC-
announcement drift is due to the Friday effect. Another interesting finding is that, on average,
the interest rate volatility amplifies at a higher speed when approaching an FOMC event.
This may be due to more unofficial market rumors and trading on interest rate uncertainty
before official news release. In short, the pre-FOMC-announcement drift seems to commence
at the beginning of an announcement week and gain momentum when approaching the
FOMC press conference.
For our purpose, we attempt to capture the exogenous impact of monetary policy rather
than the effects of upcoming FOMC meetings. Therefore, we strive to minimize the noise
introduced by the event-driven, pre-FOMC-announcement drift. We take advantage of the
Friday effect to facilitate this practice.
In detail, the trading positions of options established after a weekend are more or less
related to two types of short-term trading activities. First is the short-term hedge for the
interest rate volatility caused by an FOMC event. An approaching FOMC meeting induces
short-term uncertainty in interest rates. Risk-avoiding bond investors may enhance appetite
for hedging, leading to the bid-up of options prices. The other activity is the short-term
speculation on an FOMC decision. Speculation on possible interest rate changes may heat
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Figure 6: Averaged TYVIX Index for Announcements on Different Weekdays
up before an FOMC announcement. Both activities can temporarily drive up the demand for
10-year T-note options and the TYVIX index. The common characteristic of those tradings
is a near-zero expected return that may not be adequate to compensate for the downside
risk during the weekend. Therefore, those investors in aggregation should have limited gain
from their expectation for monetary policy. Thus trade for or against the soaring volatility
before an FOMC meeting. We attempt to diminish the impact of these trading activities.
In contrast, if other investors establish their options positions before or on the preceding
Friday and hold during the weekend, their expectation for the upcoming FOMC decision
is so strong that their expected returns on those positions overweight downside risk in the
weekend. In other words, they gain from their expectation of monetary policy and their
positions contribute to the expected component of monetary-policy-induced interest rate
volatility. Consequently, only the positions established before, and held through, the weekend
owns a tight relationship with the expectation of monetary policy.
To focus on changes in the expectation of monetary policy due to the information con-
tent of FOMC announcements, we determine both ends of the time window in light of the
Friday effect. In terms of the leading end, the Friday preceding a policy decision has the
least FOMC-event-driven trading positions of 10-year T-note options, in avoidance of the
downside risk during the weekend. More importantly, the ending quote on Friday captures
the volatility attributed to the expectation of monetary policy. It is because the corre-
sponding options positions have adequately high expected return to tolerate the risk in the
weekend. For the trailing end, the short-term hedging and speculation may halt right af-
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ter an FOMC announcement because the short-term uncertainty on interest rates may be
principally resolved by the public statement of an interest rate decision.
Consequently, we take the difference of the TYVIX index between the closing quotes on
Fridays before announcements and the closing quotes on the announcement dates. The two
ends of this time window thus are, in the highest degree, unaffected by FOMC-event-driven,
short-term trading activities. Captured changes of expected volatility in the long rate may
solely attribute to the difference between expected and actual monetary policy.
Pragmatically, instead of frequently adjusting time windows, we measure monetary-
policy-driven changes in the interest rate volatility with a unified 4-day time window. In
detail, for each FOMC meeting, we subtract the closing quote of TYVIX index in basis
point on the fourth day prior to the FOMC announcement from the closing quote on the an-
nouncement date. Then we record this difference on the FOMC announcement date. Using
this 4-day time window can accurately captures the impact of 92% of FOMC decisions in
our sample (i.e., the FOMC announcements made on Tuesday, Wednesday and Thursday)
because the four days before those weekdays all point to ending quotes on preceding Fridays.
We measure the unexpected change of the TYVIX index for each FOMC announcement
(shown in Figure 7) and generate the event-study volatility surprise. Data points in the
volatility surprise represent changes in the TYVIX index in basis point during the unified
4-day time windows around FOMC announcements. A positive volatility surprise indicates
that a policy announcement induces an increase in the expected volatility of long-term rate
and vice versa. To fit the volatility surprise in our monthly SVAR model, we convert it into
a monthly time series following a procedure discussed in Appendix C (The monthly series is
also shown in Figure 7).
Furthermore, we make minor adjustments to the time windows for FOMC announcements
released on weekdays other than Tuesday, Wednesday and Thursday. For the decisions on
Mondays, we narrow time windows into three days to set the leading end of time windows
to be Friday. As to the FOMC announcements made during the weekend, we extend the
trailing end of time windows to the ensuing Mondays in order to let financial markets to
price in those announcements. In total, we adjust the time windows for 6 out of 140 FOMC
meetings in our sample. 15
Admittedly, a potential drawback of a relatively wide time window is that it may include
the impact of economic news other than monetary policy decisions. However, event studies
for interest rate volatility are different from those for level data. We may be unnecessary
to rule out the impact of economic news as attempted by tight time window settings in
literature, such as 30 minutes or shorter. Instead, we make a less restrictive assumption
15The results are robust without adjustments.
37
Figure 7: The Volatility Surprise (Basis Point; Event Study and Monthly)
on the frequency of economics news. If economic news is frequently released and has the
same occurrence probability on dates approximating to a time window, the contribution of
economics news to interest rate volatility is relatively stable around this time window and can
be canceled out when taking the difference. As a result, if the TYVIX index in basis point is
different at the two ends of a time window, the difference should be ascribed to the varying
expectation after an FOMC announcement. This assumption renders us a potentially wider
time window, i.e., the 4-day window, because we maybe not obliged to purge all noises from
economic news.
In Table 5, we look at the relationship between volatility surprises captured by various
time windows and unconventional monetary tools. Specifically, we regress volatility surprises
captured by different time windows on the dummy variables of announcements related to
LSAPs and forward guidance. The dummies of unconventional policy tools are based on
narratives in FOMC statements. To retain consistency with the literature, we adopt identi-
cal narratives as Swanson (2017). Since almost all FOMC announcements contain sentences
regarding forward guidance, we only include those announcements that change the commu-
nication styles in the forward guidance dummy, for instance, the change from a calendar
threshold to an outcome-based threshold. Since the Federal Reserve only implements those
unconventional tools during the ZLB period, we truncate the sample to that period. As to
the exogeneity issue, we consider a volatility surprise is a reaction of the bond market to an
FOMC announcement, which includes information of those unconventional tools. Thus, we
assume a contemporaneous unidirectional impact from announcements regarding unconven-
tional tools to volatility surprises.
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Table 5: Comparison of the Time Windows for Volatility Surprises
1D 2D 3D 4D 5D
FG 27.073 54.644 68.639∗∗ 73.915∗∗ 73.915∗∗
(22.395) (37.302) (34.062) (34.174) (34.174)
LASP −68.657∗∗∗ −72.656∗∗∗ −74.980∗∗∗ −71.463∗∗∗ −71.463∗∗∗
(16.598) (22.758) (22.155) (22.271) (22.271)
Obs. 88 88 88 88 88
R2 -0.228 0.061 0.100 0.112 0.107
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Note: HAC Robust standard errors in parentheses
Table 5 shows the superiority of the four-day time window, as volatility surprises captured
by the 4-day time window has the highest correlation with announcements of unconventional
monetary policy tools than those measured in tighter or wider time windows. It confirms
our hypothesis that the pre-FOMC-announcement drift in the volatility produces more noise,
rather than reflects more information of monetary policy, in producing the volatility surprise.
Interpretation of those coefficients provides us additional insight in properties of the
volatility surprise. LSAPs are associated with negative volatility surprises, indicating that
an expansionary policy announcement reduces the perceived risk of long-term rate. Note-
worthily, I may not attribute the cause of negative volatility surprises to policy rate changes
that may be happened simultaneously with unconventional policy actions. During the ZLB
period, the policy rate is essentially zero and changes of the policy rate, either expected or
unexpected, are minimal comparing with its fluctuation during normalized interest rate pe-
riods. In contrast, volatility surprises are larger in magnitude during the ZLB period. Thus,
negative volatility surprises are more attributable to LSAPs, rather than to possible unex-
pected changes in the policy rate that coincide with those expansionary assets purchases.
Our finding that LSAPs and policy rate cuts similarly lead to negative volatility surprises is
consistent with the results in a working paper Mallick et al. (2017). They use a VAR model
with Cholesky identification as well as sign restrictions to find that a conventional policy rate
cut and an LSAP both lead to the negative response of bond yield volatility. As to forward
guidance, a change in communication styles is generally correlated with a positive volatility
surprise. Lakdawala (2016) and Kim (2017) both find that forward guidance shocks are
contractionary. The public may perceive more variation in future monetary policy shocks
due to shifts in communication approaches. In Appendix D, we provide additional details
on the connection between volatility surprises and unconventional monetary policy tools. A
forward guidance that confirms a previously set threshold tends to relate with a negative
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volatility surprise.
Through an event study featuring the 4-day time window and the utilization of TYVIX in-
dex, We obtain the event-study volatility surprise. Eventually, we convert it into a monthly
series and identify monetary policy shocks from a risk-taking channel perspective.
7 Conclusion
Monetary policy is multi-dimensional, and it contains more information than what may
be explicit by policy rate movements. The introduction of unconventional monetary policy
tools shifts our attention to policy influences in longer-term interest rates. To incorporate the
entire policy impact on the whole yield curve, we introduce a long-term interest rate as the
policy indicator into an otherwise standard monetary SVAR. In order to identify monetary
policy shocks from long-term rate fluctuations, we construct an event study from the variation
of interest rate volatility around each FOMC announcement and use the resulting time series
as an external instrument.
We estimate an empirical SVAR model to evaluate the validity of the conventional Keyne-
sian interest rate channel and the less-explored risk-taking channel within a single framework.
We find merits in the external instrument and heteroskedasticity identification approaches.
Thus, we combine elements from both in our analysis. Furthermore, we introduce a first at-
tempt to quantify the monetary-policy-induced variation in the perceived interest rate risk
in financial markets supported by an event study.
Two relatively independent transmission mechanisms are identified through the two ends
of the yield curve. Both avenues converge in the similar responses of financial frictions and
output. We conclude the interest rate volatility is a critical ingredient in identifying monetary
policy shocks from movements in the long-term real interest rate. While the transmission
through the conventional Keynesian interest rate channel is unobservable, we obtain evidence
consistent with the risk-taking channel and review the viability of the credit channel.
Our analysis does not constitute a call for a different instrument of monetary policy,
given the difficulty of accurately targeting the public’s perception of interest rate volatility,
particularly on the long end of the yield curve. Instead, we provide a tool for market
participants to analyze the potential impact of policy on long-term rates from a risk-taking
channel perspective. This paper underscores the need for further exploration in the role of
long-term interest rates in the transmission mechanism of monetary policy.
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A Algorithm for identification
Considering partitioning the mapping matrix between reduced-form residuals and structural
shocks as
S =
[
s Sq
]
=

s11 s12
s21 s22

 (17)
and the reduced-form variance-covariance matrix as
Σ =

Σ11 Σ12
Σ21 Σ22

 (18)
Since structural shocks are normalized, E[utu
′
t] = E[SS
′] = Σ and Σ is symmetric. Therefore,
(
Σ21 −
s21
s11
Σ11
)
′
(
Σ21 −
s21
s11
Σ11
)
= s12Qs
′
12 (19)
with
Q =
s21
s11
Σ11
(
s21
s11
)
′
−
(
Σ21
(
s21
s11
)
′
+
s21
s11
Σ′21
)
+ Σ22 (20)
The contemporaneous response of the policy indicator to a unit increase of monetary
policy shocks sp is derived from the underlying closed form solution.
(sp)2 = s211 = Σ11 − s12s
′
12, (21)
where the portion of reduced-form variance of the policy indicator attributed to other struc-
tural shocks
s12s
′
12 =
(
Σ21 −
s21
s11
Σ11
)
′
Q−1
(
Σ21 −
s21
s11
Σ11
)
(22)
With the estimated s21
s11
in the second-stage regression and Σ in reduced form VAR, we
obtain the estimate of s vector.
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B Supporting material for matching volatility surprises with lagged VAR resid-
uals in the equation of policy indicator
A concern about the non-contemporaneous matching is that historical values of the policy
indicator seem predictive for volatility surprises so that identified monetary policy shocks
might reflect systematic component of monetary policy. However, we find no evidence to
bolster this arguement in the daily date analysis and Granger causality test.
Table 6 shows that volatility surprises are not predictable by 10-year TIPS yield move-
ments within one week before 4-day time windows. Whereas, volatility surprises motivate
significant fluctuations in long-term TIPS yield and the impact is relatively persistent.
Table 6: Real yield effects of volatility surprises (daily event study, 2003-2018)
Week before 1-week 2-week
Maturity (Real Yield) 10Y 2Y 5Y 10Y 2Y 5Y 10Y
VOL -1.231 0.051 0.043∗∗ 0.041∗∗∗ 0.137∗∗∗ 0.074∗∗∗ 0.057∗∗
(-0.882) (1.448) (1.898) (2.717) (2.068) (2.63) (2.308)
R2 0.014 0.066 0.088 0.116 0.156 0.133 0.112
Note: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Robust t-statistic in parentheses.
Cumulative changes of Treasury real yields in the weeks before announcements as well as those
changes in one week (and two weeks) after announcements.
The standard deviation of volatility surprise is normalized to 1.
In the second colume, the volatility surprise is the dependent variable.
Table 7 indicates the Granger causality between volatility surprises and reduced-form
VAR residual in the policy indicator equation. Importantly, we pair volatility surprises with
contemporaneous policy indicator residuals. The result strongly support the unidirectional
impact of volatility surprises on policy indicator residuals.
Table 7: Pairwise Granger Causality Test
Null Hypothesis: Obs. F-statistic Prob.
VOL does not Granger Cause Policy Indicator Residual 176 5.642 0.001
Policy Indicator Residual does not Granger Cause VOL 0.344 0.793
Note: The policy indicator is 10-year TIPS yield. VAR residuals of the policy indicator
are contemporaneous with volatility surprises in the test.
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Consequently, we attribute the mismatching to the conversion procedure from daily to
monthly times series and the persistent impact of volatility surprises on the long-term real
yield.
C Conversion of the event-study volatility surprise to monthly time series
Most macro-economic variables are measured in monthly or lower frequencies. In order to
infer with macroeconomic variables in our monthly SVAR model, we convert the event-study
time series into a monthly series in three steps. First, we arrange all event-study volatility
surprises on a daily time axis according to their respective announcement dates. As the
TYVIX index measures the 30-day implied volatility of the long rate, a volatility surprise
shows the difference of investors’ expectation of long rate volatility measured for the future
30 days due to an FOMC announcement. Thus, we set the impact horizon of a volatility
surprise as 30 days to match the time length of the expectation. Second, in case of the 30-
day impacts of two volatility surprises partially overlapped, we integrate the two surprises
based on their respective FOMC announcement dates and sum up the overlapped portion.
This circumstance may incurs between an unscheduled and a scheduled FOMC meetings, or
between two unscheduled meetings. Third, we add up the impacts of volatility surprises on
each day of a month and divide the sum with number of days in a month (i.e. 30 days).
Consequently, we derive the monthly volatility surprise as shown in Figure 8.
Figure 8: The Volatility Surprise (Monthly & Daily; Basis Point)
Overall, the monthly volatility surprise retains the features of the event-study time series,
such as the timing of peaks and troughs, the mean reverting property, etc. However, in
monthly series, we notice that one positive spike on October 2008, which amounts to more
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than 8 times of sample standard deviation, is more prominent than its counterpart in event-
study series. As shown in Figure 8, we truncate the data on October 2008 to the same
level as that on September 2008 to diminish the distortion. The distinctive spike is due
to the different ways of recording volatility surprise impacts in the two series. Near the
October 2008, two emergent unscheduled FOMC meetings were held on September 29th and
October 7th. Both meetings induce large positive volatility surprises, indicating the policy
actions announced after those meetings aggravate the long-term perceived risk in interest
rates. Those meetings are less-than-30-day apart. In the event-study series, the impacts
of those meetings are parallelly registered on their respective dates and do not intervene
with each other. In contrast, the monthly time series lengthen the impacts of volatility
surprises to 30 days and adds up the overlapped impacts of two meetings with less than
30-day interval. Therefore, if two or more FOMC meetings are closely adjoined and generate
volatility surprises in an identical sign, the monthly time series may be distorted by the
resulting extremely large spike. This phenomenon is prominent in October 2008 and a
truncation is applied to restore the distortion.
Admittedly, this conversion approach may fall short in identifying the timing of events.
For example, if an FOMC announcement is made at the end of month t. In event-study time
series, this volatility surprise is in the month t. However, in monthly conversion, since the
30 days after the meeting majorly locate in month t + 1, the principle volatility surprise is
recorded in month t+1, rather than in the month when it actually happens. This shortcoming
partially explains why the monthly volatility surprise matches better with the lagged VAR
residual of the policy indicator.
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D The volatility surprise and unconventional monetary policy tools
The volatility surprise provide us insight in the risk-side impact of unconventional monetary
policy tools. Table 8 shows that changing forward guidance communication style is often
associated with a positive volatility surprise. The public may perceive more variation in
future monetary policy shocks due to shifts in communication approach. In general, an-
nouncements of LSAPs lead to negative voaltility surprises as LSAPs reconfirm the goal of
monetary policy, which is to curtail the downside economic risk. More interestingly, the
gradual exit of balance sheet approaches also causes negative volatility surprises. However,
these may not contribute to reduction in monetary easing; instead, they may be attributed
to the improvement of economic prospect.
Table 8: Reactions of the Volatility Surprise to Important Policy Changes (Event Study)
Dates Communication Volatility Surpirse
Forward Guidance
2009/03/18 ZLB for an extended period 1.397
2011/08/09 Adopt calendar threshold 2.890
2012/01/25 Extend calendar threshold -1.153
2012/09/13 Extend calendar threshold 0.032
2012/12/12 Adopt outcome-based threshold 0.146
2013/12/18 Confirm outcome-based threshold -0.951
2014/03/19 Confirm outcome-based threshold -0.476
2014/12/17 Confirm outcome-based threshold -1.649
LSAPs
2008/10/29 Announce QE1 -3.114
2010/09/21 Clarify reinvestment policies -0.352
2010/11/03 Announce QE2 -0.352
2011/09/21 Announce the Operational Twist -1.087
2011/09/21 Announce QE3 0.032
2013/12/18 Slowing purchases -0.951
2014/09/17 Balance sheet normalization -0.601
Note: Volatility surprises are normalized to unit standard deviation.
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